The Role of Leadership by Foss, Nicolai & Stieglitz, Nils
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
   
   
   
   
 10. February, 2014 
 
 
   
 
BUSINESS MODEL INNOVATION: THE ROLE OF LEADERSHIP 
 
 
Nicolai J. Foss 
 
And 
 
Nils Stieglitz 
 
 
 
 
 
SMG WP 2/2014 
978-87-91815-12-6 
 
SMG Working Paper No. 2/2014 
February, 2014 
ISBN: 978-87-91815-93-5 
 
 
 
 
978-87-91815-23-2 
978-87-91815-24-9 978-87-91815-24-9 
978-87-91815-24-9 
978-87-91815-24-9 
978-87-91815-24-9 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Department of Strategic Management and Globalization 
Copenhagen Business School 
Kilen, Kilevej 14A 
2000 Frederiksberg  
Denmark 
www.cbs.dk/smg 
 BUSINESS MODEL INNOVATION: THE ROLE OF LEADERSHIP  
Nicolai Foss 
Department of Strategic Management and Globalization 
Copenhagen Business School 
Kilevej 14, second floor 
2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark 
njf.smg@cbs.dk 
and 
Department of Strategy and Management 
Norwegian School of Economics  
Breiviksveien 40 
N-5045 Bergen, Norway 
 
Nils Stieglitz 
Frankfurt School of Finance and Management 
Sonnemannstr. 9-11 
603214 Frankfurt am Main, Germany 
n.stieglitz@fs.de 
 
 
Forthcoming in Nicolai J Foss and Tina Saebi, eds. Business Model Innovation: The 
Organisational Dimension. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
 
10. February, 2014 
 
Keywords: Business models, complementarities, leadership. 
JEL Code: D21, L23, M10 
  
1 
 
 
 
BUSINESS MODEL INNOVATION: THE ROLE OF LEADERSHIP  
 
 
Abstract 
We draw on the complementarity literature in economics and management research 
to dimensionalize business models innovations. Specifically, such innovation can be 
dimensionalized in terms of the depth and the breadth of the changes to the 
company’s business model that they imply. In turn, different business model 
innovations are associated with different management challenges and require 
different leadership interventions to become successful. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In spite of the massive attention in the practitioner and research literature over the last decade to 
business models and the innovation thereof (cf. Massa & Tucci, 2013; Zott, Amit & Massi, 
2013), little or no research so far has dealt with the leadership aspects of business model 
innovation (“BMI”) in a systematic manner. And yet, business model innovation can be a 
massive organizational change process that places very heavy demands on top-management and 
potentially strains the organization.  Moreover, business model innovations are far from 
homogenous. Some may involve relatively minor connected changes in, for example, the 
customer segments that are addressed and the revenue model in a business unit. Other BMIs may 
be massive corporate-wide processes that involve basically all employees and all processes and 
activities. It seems reasonable to argue that different BMIs therefore pose different leadership 
requirements. 
However, we know of no analysis that systematically links BMI, appropriately 
dimensionalized, to an understanding of the different competences of leadership and 
organizational design that are required to cope with the challenges represented by different kinds 
of BMIs. This is not to say that organizational and leadership challenges associated with business 
models and BMI have been neglected; in fact, this is far from being the case (e.g.,Chesbrough & 
Rosenbloom, 2002; Margretta, 2002; Casadesus-Masanell & Ricart, 2010; Chesbrough, 2007, 
2010; Demil & Lecoq, 2010; Doz & Kosenen, 2010; Teece, 2010; Zott & Amit, 2010; Amit & 
Zott, 2012). However, existing research does not offer a contingency perspective. A key reason 
is that the unit of analysis is not clearly characterized. Specifically, existing research does not 
adequately represent the heterogeneity of BMI, and therefore does not dimensionalize BMI. In 
turn, the different leadership challenges that different kinds of BMI give rise to are not identified.  
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Accordingly, in this chapter we take some preliminary steps towards a developing a 
theory of the leadership requirements of BMI, given a theoretically grounded dimensionalization 
of BMI. The theory is fundamentally a contingency theory and leaves out many important 
process aspects.  Our reasoning starts from noting the inherently systemic character of business 
models. Indeed, as argued elsewhere in this volume (e.g., Foss and Saebi, chapter 1), the main 
contribution that the business model literature has brought to macro-management theory may 
well in retrospect turn out to be an emphasis on the need for integration of and coherence among 
strategic choices related to value proposition, segments, value appropriation models, and value 
chain organization. It is well known from the literature on coordination in complex systems that 
system elements may stand in different relations of specificity and complementarity to each other 
(Lachmann, 1956; Milgrom & Roberts, 1990; Williamson, 1996; Levinthal, 1997). The need for 
leadership and a planned approach to the allocation over responsibilities, roles, and tasks—that 
is, organizational design—, derive from such interdependencies. We argue that a key dimension 
along which business models (and hence the innovation thereof) may differ is exactly in terms of 
the strength of the interdependencies, or, as we shall say, “complementarities,” between their 
constituent components.  
The purpose of this chapter is to unfold this overall theme.  By placing complementarity” 
centrally in our thinking about BMI, we add to the literature by 1) developing a taxonomy of 
BMI that is based on a dimensionalization of BMIs in terms of complementarity; 2) identifying 
limits/constraints to successful BMI; and 3) highlighting the role of the top management 
interventions in terms of making BMIs successful.  
BUSINESS MODELS AND COMPLEMENTARITIES 
Business Models in the Space of Strategic Management Theory  
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Although science can make progress even in the presence of considerable conceptual 
ambiguity, there is little doubt that scientific advances are assisted by the presence of construct 
clarity (Suddaby, 2010), particularly clarity of the key constructs that organize and differentiate 
research efforts, streams and programs. Distinct research streams thrive by organizing research 
around core constructs that are clearly delineated from core constructs in other, neighboring 
research streams. The concept of a business model was coined several decades ago (Bellman & 
Clark, 1957; Jones, 1960), and sustained, cumulative academic work that is explicitly organized 
around the business model construct has been going on for at least a decade-and-a-half (e.g., 
Chesbrough & Rosenbloom, 2002).
1
 And yet, no single, clear, unifying definition of the 
construct that is also clearly delineated from related constructs has been advanced. What we have 
instead is a plethora of definitions (see also Foss & Saebi, chapter 1), many of which bear a 
distinct resemblance to existing constructs in strategic management. For this reason, many of the 
proponents of the business model construct have often been at pains to differentiate it from more 
established strategic management constructs (e.g., Casadesus-Masanell & Ricart, 2011). 
Sometimes business models are seen as subordinate and sometimes as superordinate to business 
strategy. Our position is that the business model concept has drawn attention to a fundamental 
perspective in strategy that arguably was present at the inception of strategy thinking but was 
forgotten as academic specialization came to characterize strategic management. The perspective 
is outlined in the following quotation (Rumelt, Schendel & Teece, 1991: 5):  
 ...firms have choices to make if they are to survive. Those that are strategic include: the 
selection of goals; the choice of products and services to offer; the design and 
configuration of ... competitive strategy; the choice of an appropriate level of scope and 
                                                          
1
 We do not here pursue the theme of whether earlier research (e.g., Teece, 1986) in actuality dealt with business 
models, even though it did not use the term. 
5 
 
diversity; and the design of organization structure, administrative systems and policies 
used to define and coordinate work ... It is the integration (or reinforcing pattern) 
among these choices that makes a set a strategy. 
This definition of strategy accords well with, for example, Zott, Amit and Massa (2011: 
1037) argument that a business model is a “system level concept” that contains a “systemic and 
holistic understanding of how an organization orchestrates its system of activities for value 
creation” (Massa & Tucci, 2013: 9). What makes it “systemic” is exactly the notion that the 
choices can be reinforcing, as suggested by Rumelt et al. (1991).  
Defining Business Models  
Teece (2010: 172) provides a neat definition of a business model as the “… architecture 
that the company has chosen for its value creation and appropriation mechanisms.“ The key 
word in this definition is “architecture.”  We define an architecture as the set of relations among 
elements in a system (Simon, 1969), where these relations can be characterized in such terms as 
directionality (i.e., are relations sequentially or reciprocally dependent?), strength, and content 
(notably, information content). The architecture can in turn be characterized in terms of 
complexity.  
In the context of a business model, extant literature suggests that the relevant elements 
are clusters of activities that can be grouped under the headings of the company’s overall value 
proposition (What?), the market segments it addresses with this value proposition (Who?), its 
mechanisms of value appropriation (How much?), the structure of the value chain required to 
create and distribute the offering, the complementary resources needed to support the firm’s 
position in this chain, and the processes and internal organization of the firm that support the 
other elements in the business model (How?). Thus, a business model is a system made up of the 
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interdependent activities that allows the company to address the What, Who, How, and How 
Much questions.  
While much discussion of business models mentions interdependencies (notably Amit & 
Zott, 2012), there has been a strong tendency in the more applied literature to emphasize one or 
two elements of a business model; for example, such as “freemium” business models which call 
attention to only the value proposition and the revenue model or “cutting out the middleman” 
models that only highlight value chain aspects.  While this is so is an interesting issue from the 
point of view of managerial cognition. However, the point here is that such discussions typically 
neglect the interdependencies between activities underlying a business model—and accordingly 
neglect the distinct organizational and leadership challenges present in systems with 
interdependencies.   Although interdependencies are fundamentally choice variables (Milgrom & 
Roberts, 1990) and there may be business models with weak interdependencies between 
activities, they certainly cannot always be neglected. The case of the BMI of Danish toy 
producer, Lego, may illustrate this (Foss, Schultz, Pedersen & Pyndt, 2012). 
Business Model Innovation in Lego 
Lego, headquartered in Billund, Denmark, is currently the world’s second largest toy 
producer with 10,000+ employees worldwide, and 2012 sales of approximately 4,5 billion USD 
and profits of about a billion USD. Though not a big company internationally it has no doubt 
exhibited a high performance over the last decade growing from a position as the seventh largest 
toy producer to the second place in a stagnant industry. However, in 2004 the company was on 
the verge of bankruptcy, arguably as a result of an ambitious diversification strategy. Partly 
prompted by the expiration of the basic Lego brick patent in 1983, the company had diversified 
into theme parks, merchandise, and products that essentially had little to do with the emphasis on 
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construction and creative play that had been core values since the inception of the company. This 
had been accompanied by a strategy of pursuing a high degree of vertical integration.  
Massive losses and decline in sales towards the end of 2004 led to the dismissal of the 
CEO and the appointment of a new CEO, Jørgen Vig Knudstorp who with a PhD in business 
administration and serving as the manager of Lego’s internal strategic planning unit was a 
peripheral insider with strong analytical capabilities. Over the coming years he essentially 
innovated the Lego business model in four key dimensions. Specifically, Knudstorp trimmed the 
product offering and the number of inputs entering into Lego products; restructured the supply 
chain in terms of engaging in substantial outsourcing and offshoring; made the company’s 
boundaries vis-á-vis customers and users substantially more permeable by creating user 
communities and engaging in joint new product development efforts with major customers; and 
stepping up the digitalization content of both operations and products.  
With respect to the trimming of the product portfolio and the use of component inputs, 
Lego phased out production most non-construction Lego toys (many licensing agreements have 
been kept, however), sold of major assets, notably the Lego theme parks, and reduced the 
number of sourced product components from 12,700 to currently approximately 6,000. 
Knudstorp’s moves here were explicitly influenced by organizational economics, as he reasoned 
that reducing products and inputs would strongly reduce managerial complexity and bring down 
internal transaction costs. Similarly, the many changes in Lego’s supply chain away from the 
highly vertically integrated model was explicitly inspired by the belief that hierarchy is the 
option of last resort (Williamson, 1996) and that firms in general do well by relying on the high 
powered incentives of the market. Thus, much actual production activity was outsourced to 
Flextronics, a Fortune 500 company and one of the world’s leading supply chain service firms. 
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Many of the outsourced activities (in Hungary and the Czech Republic) had already been 
offshored from Denmark to save costs. Lego kept the production of more advanced products 
(such as Lego Technic and Bionicle) in Billund close to headquarters. Difficulties of maintaining 
plastic quality later led Lego to insource some of those activities that had been outsourced to 
Flextronics.  
In terms of reaching out to users and customers, Lego engaged in a series of activities, such 
as Lego Factory which encouraged children to build their own designs using Lego Digital 
Designer Software) (the activity was closed 2012, though the software remains in the public 
domain; close cooperation on the new product development with Wal-Mart and Toys “R” Us; 
and the establishment of Lego Certified Professionals,  thirteen adults “super users” worldwide 
who are allowed to use the Lego concept in, for example, the production of lamps or customized 
solutions for select customers (e.g., building company headquarters in Lego bricks).   
The above initiatives were supported by a consistent digitalization process, not only 
internally and with respect to sourcing partners, but also with respect to customers and users.  
 The above changes, which played out between 2004 and 2008, involved a set of 
interrelated changes in business model component. In terms of the earlier simple distinction 
between the “what,” “who”, “how” and “how much” components of a business model, Lego’s 
BMI involved changes in all four components. Thus, in the “What” dimension, the change 
amounted to a change back to construction as the core, in harmony with the key company value 
“creative play.” This change was consistent with the increased emphasis on digitalization to the 
extent that this may be seen as being about leveraging the creativity dimension in virtual space. 
These changes included changes in the Who dimension. Of course, those segments that demand 
traditional non-construction toys were eliminated from the Lego customer portfolio, while Lego 
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strengthened its outreach to sophisticated, adult users. In terms of the How dimension, Lego 
engaged in substantial outsourcing and offshoring, as explained above, and also made numerous 
changes in terms of strengthening incentives and changing the allocation of decision rights inside 
the company.  In particular, the company’s purchasing functions was decentralized to support the 
strong reduction of the number of sourced components that had exploded because engineers held 
decision rights to initiate component purchase on their own. The increased emphasis on 
permeable downstream company boundaries, that is, working closely with sophisticated buyers 
and users, was also a change in the How dimension as this organizational allowed the company 
to execute an open innovation strategy. Finally, in the How Much dimension Lego’s 
performance was strongly improved by the trimming of the product and component portfolios, 
offshoring and outsourcing, and a continuous emphasis on cost-cutting and lean.   
 As indicated, the various changes in the Lego business model fed on each other. A simple 
way to represent this is captured in Figure 1 which juxtaposes the four business model elements 
in Lego and how its process of BMI from in the 2004 to 2008 period involved interconnected 
changes in these elements.
2
   
-------- Insert Figure 1 Here --------- 
And yet, the fact that the changes were implemented sequentially rather than simultaneously 
suggests that the changes did not possess maximum interconnectedness (in which case they 
would have to be implemented exactly simultaneously). However, once implemented the 
changes in the Lego business model constituted an interlocking system because each element of 
the model feeds on the other ones.  The technical term for this systemic property is 
“complementarity” and the individual business model elements are “complements.”  As we 
                                                          
2
 The figure can be refined in a number of ways, for example, by detailing the activities underlying the various 
business model elements.  
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argue next, he complementarity framework provides a convenient, choice-theoretic approach to 
thinking about BMI in terms of definition, performance consequences and difficulties of 
implementing it.  
Complementarities and Business Model Innovation 
A basic assumption in the complementarity framework is that if changes in n activities can 
be made separately, changes can also be made simultaneously (Brynjolfsson & Milgrom, 2013: 
15). A broad definition then states that complementarity obtains if the profits from doing the 
activities jointly is higher than the sum of the profits from doing the activities in isolation. If the 
changes involve design decisions involving fixing the levels of a set of variables (say, x and y), 
complementarity obtains when choosing a higher level of  x raises the returns of choosing a 
higher level of y and vice versa (more precise definitions, based on lattice algebra, may be found 
in Milgrom & Roberts, 1990; Brynjolfsson & Milgrom, 2013). The connection to Figure 1 is 
easily seen (cf. also Brynjolfsson, Renshaw, & Van Alstyne, 1997).  
From the point of a strategist and organizational designer complementarities represent both 
opportunities and constraints. Because of the fundamental synergistic property of 
complementarities they represent opportunities for additional value creation. In fact, if all 
activities are not completely flexible in the short run (which they virtually never are) 
opportunities tend to be larger in the long run than in the short run in systems with 
complementarities. The reason is that some decisions will have to be fixed in the short run but 
can be made flexible in the long run (as in the textbook economics analysis of the firm’s 
production decision). For this reason systems of complementarities will typically exhibit 
momentum in the sense that doing x at time t0 will make it more attractive to do y at t1 and 
perhaps z at t2. Lego’s process of BMI from 2004 to 2008 seems to exhibit such a dynamic: The 
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initial reduction of the product offering allowed for a concentration of fewer suppliers and 
realizing scale economies in purchasing. Concentrating purchasing in turn eased the more 
widespread use of outsourcing. Outsourcing and offshoring drove massive cost savings that 
helped support the company’s increased emphasis on digitalization which in turn facilitated a 
stronger engagement with users and customers. Given this momentum it is not surprising that 
Lego seized its largest profits after its BMI was completed.  
  Although realizing complementarities would seem to be a key goal of the strategic 
organization designer, systems with complementarities may be complex and have multiple local 
equilibria that can usually be ranked on some performance criterion (notably, productivity or 
profitability). Usually the global optimum is by no means given to the decision maker, but can 
only be approximated through a process of more or less deliberate search (Levinthal 1997; 
Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000; Stieglitz & Heine, 2007). Such search processes may reveal the 
existence of hidden complementarities that represent further opportunities for increasing profits.. 
Conversely, search may reveal the existence of “anti-complementarities” or organizational 
substitutes (Siggelkow, 2002). Thus, Brynjolfsson, Renshaw and Alstyne (1997) document an 
instance of business process reengineering where new flexible manufacturing equipment was 
installed but used for the purpose of long, uninterrupted product runs by a supervisor and a team 
that relied on decades-old heuristics developed for traditional manufacturing practices 
(Brynjolfsson & Milgrom, 2013: 27).  
Search, Learning and Business Model Innovation 
In management research, the NK model, originally developed in evolutionary biology, has 
developed into a workhorse model to capture complex tasks such as the design of business 
models (Kauffman, 1993; Levinthal, 1997). In the model, parameter K captures interactions 
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between design elements and shapes the ruggedness of search space. The more pervasive the 
interactions (the higher the K), the more local optima exist, and the more difficult and uncertain 
is the identification and development of high performing business model. How an organization 
structures and manages its search process becomes critical for ultimate performance. At the same 
time, the NK model also reveals that complementarities, while challenging BMI, also serve as an 
effective barrier to imitation (Rivkin, 2000; Lenox et al. 2010) that isolates the innovator from 
imitative competition (Rumelt, 1984) (if not from other kinds of competition). The tighter the fit 
among business model elements, the harder it becomes for competitors to imitate the basis for 
competitive advantages, and the more likely is it that imitation of only parts of the business 
model deteriorates performance (Rivkin, 2000; Ryall, 2009). Thus, complementarities are a bane 
to successful BMI, but a blessing for protecting its rewards.  
Viewed from the complementarity perspective, BMI is very much a process of search, 
learning, experimentation, usually with uncertain performance prospects. Recall that it took Lego 
four years to develop and execute its new business model, and many of its new elements were 
not in place when the top management began the re-design. Given that a new business model is 
not planned ex ante, but usually emerges in an extended design process (Mintzberg & Waters, 
1985; Gavetti & Rivkin, 2007), the emphasis shifts toward how to structure and manage the 
process of innovating the business model. Leadership and organizational design may facilitate, 
channel, or even impede the search for a new business model. However, while prior research has 
focused on the benefits and the outcomes of BMI, the leadership and organizational design 
challenges BMI are strongly under-research.  However, there are certainly indications in the 
literature. For instance,  Chesbrough (2010) suggests that 1) barriers to BMI may be caused by 
underlying asset configurations, and that 2) such barriers may be overcome by constructing maps 
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of present potential business models and by conferring authority within the hierarchy for 
experimentation to rejuvenate traditional business models.  
In the following, we further develop such ideas further by a) suggesting that BMIs can be 
dimensionalized in terms of the complementarities they involve; b) that different kinds of BMIs 
create distinct managerial and organizational challenges; and c) require distinct leadership 
intervention and organizational design configurations to tackle these challenges successfully.   
Dimensionalizing and Mapping Business Model Innovations 
As already alluded to above, not all BMIs are created equal. Innovations may have a 
differential impact on existing complementarities (Henderson & Clark 1990; Stieglitz & Heine 
2007) and the scope for BMI is constrained by the complementarities that are in place. For 
example, contrast Amazon’s Kindle business model with the restructuring of Lego. In the case of 
Lego, many elements changed and Knudstorp changed decisively the overall Lego architecture 
by re-wiring many elements of the business model. In retrospect, many of the individual changes 
to business model elements may not have been that radical, such as making more use of 
outsourcing, selling off theme parks and so on.  The Lego BMI may in retrospect have been 
more of an architectural change of numerous elements, feeding on each other. In particular, Lego 
did not enter new business areas (rather, they exited some).  
 In contrast, the Kindle eReader was a radical departure for Amazon, since it took the 
company into entirely new business domains. At the same time, Amazon’s traditional e-
commerce business was (so far) hardly affected by the new Kindle business model. The Kindle 
devices have been developed by lab126, a subsidiary of Amazon and a dedicated business unit 
that focuses on the underlying business model.   
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Obviously, the system-wide, architectural changes of Lego confront business model 
designers with different challenges than the more modular, autonomous BMI of the Kindle. 
Thus, Lego and Amazon differ in terms of the breadth of changes in the business model. 
Modular changes to a business model are confined to particular business units or departments, 
while not changing elements in other parts of the firm. Architectural changes rewire 
complementarities across business units and departments.  
Furthermore, BMIs may differ in the depth of changes (Katila & Ahuja 2002). The 
Amazon Kindle offers a new value proposition—the What in the context of business model—
that represents a radical departure from the company’s e-commerce activities. In contrast, LEGO 
did not radically alter its answers to the “what” and “who” questions: Products were not changed 
dramatically and the company did not go forcefully after a new customer segment.  
By combining the two dimensions of BMI—the depth and the breadth of (intended) 
changes to an existing BMI—we propose a 2x2 matrix to classify four forms of BMI; see Figure 
2.   
-------- Insert Figure 2 Here --------- 
Note that BMI is distinct from product innovations and we only invoke product names to 
fix ideas. 
The upper right-hand corner represents the continuous refinement of an existing business 
model, akin to incremental process innovations. To illustrate, consider continuous BMI at 
Google. Google’s core business model remains the Internet search engine, with a clear value 
proposition and an appropriation regime that offers free content and revenues from 
advertisement. At the same time, the business model has been honed for the last decade by 
evolving the underlying organizational and information architecture.  In the upper left-hand, we 
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locate the Kindle case, where changes are radical relative to Amazon’s existing business model, 
but they are primarily contained in a loosely coupled business unit. Because of the organizational 
separation of old and new business model, we call this type ambidextrous BMI (e.g. O’Reilly & 
Tushman, 2004).  
Facebook’s attempt to integrate and monetize mobile access to their social network is an 
illustrative of BMI that is incremental--the “what” and the “who” do not change substantially--
while being architectural in nature, affecting the entire system of value-creating and value-
capturing activities, thereby changing fundamentally the logic of the underlying business model. 
Because the focus is on the gradual transformation of the BM we refer to it as evolutionary BMI. 
Finally, Steve Jobs’ radical restructuring of Apple is a primary example for a revolutionary BMI 
that is both radical and architectural. The new business model – creating a device-independent 
eco-system – required new hardware devices, integrated software development of operating 
systems, a different approach to application software, and new retail structures.     
Amazon has launched multiple versions of Kindle device – and these product innovations 
follow the logic of the business model. In fact, BMI often precedes product innovation by 
spelling out the logic of value creation and value appropriation and thereby providing the 
organizational architecture for product development.  
LEADING AND DESIGNING COMPANIES FOR BUSINESS MODEL INNOVATION 
Challenges of Business Model Innovations 
Because of the complementarities among elements of a business model, innovating 
existing business models present unique challenges whose severity depends on the form of the 
BMI that the company seeks to implement (cf. Figure 2). In particular, the complementarity 
framework directs attention to three challenges: First, inertial forces caused by the existing set of 
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complementary elements in the traditional business model; second, the limits to ex ante planning; 
and, third, the problem of maintaining coherence among business model elements.  
 The first challenge relates to the inertia caused by the system of existing elements of a 
business model. Given that the existing logic may have gradually emerged over long stretches of 
time, the present model typically offers a tight fit of elements and a compelling logic, especially 
if it made the firm successful in the past. Incremental interventions, that is, changing just a few 
elements, might improve upon the status quo, but they will not radically alter the existing 
business model (Milgrom & Roberts, 1990). Moreover, isolated and uncoordinated changes often 
fail to improve performance; the new initiative does not fit to the existing business model and 
will therefore be discarded (Siggelkow & Rivkin, 2003). That is, the system is set up for the 
incremental and modular improvement of the existing business model (continuous BMI in Figure 
2), but other forms of BMI are much harder to initiate and sustain successfully due to the 
conservative pull of the existing complementarities  
 The second challenge is caused by the complexity of complementary elements. Due to 
the inherent complexity when there are many interacting elements, it is not easy to forecast the 
true performance implications of internal changes (Rivkin, 2000). For example, in the Lego case 
it was obvious that the turn “back to the brick” would lead to cost savings, for example, because 
of reduced coordination costs and diseconomies of scope, but the impact of trimming the product 
portfolio firm boundaries, product development, and user involvement were much harder to 
discern ex ante. The problem of estimating performance implications becomes more difficult 
when changes are architectural and more radical. Architectural changes affect many 
complementary elements at the same time. More radical changes imply a sharper departure from 
the current knowledge about the business model and take the designer into new, yet unexplored 
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territory (Levinthal & March 1993). The problem is magnified by uncertainty about market 
conditions. That is, the internal uncertainty about the “How” is magnified by uncertainties about 
the value creation (“what”), the relevant customer segment “who”, and the competitive dynamics 
(the “How much”).,  When Amazon launched the Kindle, the market for eReaders and tablet PCs 
was just in its formative stages. The overall implication is that Knightian uncertainty (Foss & 
Klein 2012)—pervasive uncertainty about probabilities and outcomes—often challenges BMI, 
especially of the revolutionary BMI in Figure 2.  
 Finally, the third challenge relates to the requirement of establishing and maintaining 
coherence among business model elements. The major insight emerging from a complementarity 
perspective is that individual elements have to fit to each other to realize their full potential 
(Milgrom & Roberts 1990). Establishing coherence requires search and learning about how 
elements complements (or substitutes for) each other, while maintaining coherence calls for 
stabilizing and integrating the relationship between elements. This presents a clear tension to the 
business model designer because she needs to balance the conflicting demands of search and 
coordination. Otherwise, the company runs the risk of performance-damaging over-exploration 
(Siggelkow & Rivkin, 2006) that might entrap the company (March, 1991), explorative search 
reducing performance, in turn triggering more exploration and failure in a destructive cycle. For 
example, the failing social network site MySpace undertook several unsuccessful business model 
redesigns during the last years to stay viable and prevent bankruptcy.     
    In sum, the challenges stemming from complementary elements in a business model 
become more severe with increasing depth and breadth. Increasing depth of changes invalidates 
prior knowledge about the underlying system of complementary elements and thereby puts a 
premium on search and learning. Increasing the breadth of changes disrupts coherence to a larger 
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extent and coordinated action becomes critical for BMI. In the next steps, we address how 
leadership and organization design may be aligned with the BMI to address these outlined 
challenges. 
Leading Business Model Innovations 
Because the types of BMI differ in associated challenges, the role of top management in 
leading the BMI process correspondingly differs (Figure 3).  
-------- Insert Figure 3 Here --------- 
Top management as monitor.  When BMI is modular and incremental, that is, it is 
basically a refinement of an existing business model, most development activities can be 
decentralized to subordinates.  The organization supports the execution of the current business 
model while providing for its continuous improvement. Interfaces are largely standardized, with 
the set of complementary relationship firmly in place and offering routine integration across 
departments. Mutual adjustment therefore is kept to a minimum, while the primary role of 
incentives is to motivate optimal effort in executing the tasks inherent in the current business 
model.  
Partial inertia here is value-enhancing, because it preserves the core of business model, 
and that is also the strategic intent of the BMI. The idea is to continuously improve value 
creation and value appropriation, although without questioning the existing answers to the What, 
Who, How, and How much questions. Top management’s primary function is to act as the 
central monitor, without active involvement in the daily development of the business model. The 
monitoring role is to ensure that employees do not overstep their mandates and that changes to 
the BM do not go against its core logic. Put differently, employees tasked with business model 
development exercise derived judgment (Foss & Klein, 2012).  On the level of incentives, top-
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management must ensure that improvements to the current business are properly incentivized 
and rewarded through the design of KPIs and performance measurement systems. 
Of course, this type of BMI runs the risk of being replaced by disruptive changes in the 
market environment. For example, Nokia engaged in largely modular and incremental 
improvement of their business-model in the late 2000s, assuming wrongly that the smartphone 
era were just an evolution of feature phones (where Nokia ruled supreme). This point to the 
second dimension of top management as a monitor: It is top management’s responsibility to track 
external environments and make judgment calls whether the existing business model remains 
viable. Another implication is that this BMI form is ill-suited to address disruptive changes that 
threaten the viability of the traditional business model or to get the company out of a crisis. For 
example, Lego’s turnaround was only possible by a major, architectural BMI.  
Top management as sponsor. In the case of a modular, radical BMI the top management 
team needs to act as the sponsor for the business unit (Smith & Tushman 2005). Separation of 
new and old business model will often be key, it can be achieved by what prior literature has 
termed structural ambidexterity (O’Reilly & Tushman 2004):  Old and new business units are 
separated organizational as far as necessary, with linkages either regulated through standardized 
or by infrequent mutual adjustments sponsored by top management.  The idea here is to provide 
for a loose coupling, so that the new unit can effectively experiment and concentrate on a radical 
new organization design. This is especially relevant in terms of reward structures that need to 
ingrain milestones and growth targets rather than productivity and profits. For example, the 
Kindle initiative at Amazon requires different KPIs than managers charged with the Amazon’s e-
commerce services. 
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Strategic and tactical decision-making is largely delegated to the new unit that may 
concentrate fully on the new business model, without having to integrate it with the existing BM 
logic in other parts of the organization. For instance, most BM decisions for the Amazon Kindle 
were taken by Gregg Zahr, the president of Amazon’s subsidiary lab126. lab126 has a different 
vision statement than Amazon. While Amazon’s projects its vision to become the “Earth’s most 
customer-centric company for four primary customer sets: consumers, sellers, enterprises, and 
content creators”,3 lab126 focuses more narrowly on the seamless provision of digital content: 
“to make available in less than 60 seconds every book, ever written, in any language, in print our 
out of print; and bring the same ease-of-use, deep integration and superior selection of content to 
movies, TV shows, music, magazines, apps, games, and more.”4 The conservative pull of the 
existing business model therefore is not much of a challenge, precisely because old and new 
initiatives are largely separated. The key task is search and experimentation—and a decentralized 
leadership style supports this.  
 Yet, the hands-off approach to this BMI form still places unique responsibilities on the 
top management team. First, radical BM innovations are more exploratory, implying more 
uncertain and distant rewards (March, 1991). The radical nature implies a higher degree of 
uncertainty, thereby calling for different performance metrics and KPIs that are currently in place 
for the established business unit. In terms of leadership challenges this has primarily an impact 
on the performance dimensions long which resources are allocated (Noda & Bower 1996). 
Senior management has to act as an active sponsor of the new initiative, especially against 
internal pressures for capital re-allocations. Second, while largely modular in nature, relevant 
complementarities with the rest of the organization often still exist. For example, a critical 
                                                          
3
 http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=97664&p=irol-faq_pf#14296 (February 10, 2014). 
4
 http://www.lab126.com/our-vision.htm (February 10, 2014). 
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element of the Kindle BM is to develop the Amazon marketplace into a platform for digital 
products. That obviously requires coordination choices about how integrate digital products into 
the marketplace, how to communicate with Kindle users, etc. To provide for coherence, the top 
management team must act as residual boundary spanner between the old and the new business 
model. A critical task in that regard is to overcome inertia in the traditional business model as the 
conservative pull there is especially strong. If top management refuses to get involved as a 
sponsor, this form of BMI often ultimately fails, because it is unable to leverage firm-wide 
capabilities and competitive advantages (Smith & Tushman, 2005; Carmeli & Halevi, 2009).  
Top management as moderator. Compared to the two BMI forms discussed so far, the 
architectural and incremental changes in an evolutionary BMI put more demands on top 
management leadership. The innovation affects the entire business model and changes are not 
neatly confined to a separate business unit. Top management here as to act as the moderator that 
a) provides a coarse roadmap of system-wide interventions to innate and guide search and b) 
moderates the many conflicts and changes to re-establish coherence. The two roles of the 
moderator address the outlined challenges for BMIs.  
A roadmap of system-wide interventions is required to shake up the existing set of 
complementarities, to trigger a broad search for a new business model, and to guide its evolution 
(Lovas & Ghosal, 2000). The roadmap also signals the commitment of senior management to 
BMI, an important behavioral component given that a tolerance for failure is an important part 
for enabling search and experimentation (Levinthal & March 1993). At the same time, the 
roadmap also gives purpose and direction to the search process, preventing mission creep and too 
much experimentation. Prior theoretical work on organizational search demonstrated that 
decentralization of search may result in performance-decreasing over-exploration (Siggelkow & 
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Rivkin, 2006). For example, Facebook’s successful evolution toward mobile advertisement was 
engineered by top management, because it required many changes to core parts of its business 
model.  
 The other role of the top management moderator is to establish and maintain coherence 
among business elements. That requires the resolution of conflicts among business units, task 
that often needs centralized intervention (Williamson, 1991). For example, at LEGO, conflicts 
between the design studio and manufacturing emerged: While the reduction of standard LEGO 
bricks offered economies of scale and reduced production costs, it constraints designers in the 
development of new construction sets. Only after that conflict was resolved in favor of 
manufacturing did LEGO realize that the reduction of the designers’ toolbox also facilitate user 
involvement in the product development process.     
 The broad picture here is what operations researchers have called a simulated annealing 
process (Carley & Svoboda 1996): The initial heating up of search to unfreeze a system and, in 
turn, the gradual cooling down of search intensity. Critically, simulated annealing does not 
happen naturally in organizations, but demands to be carefully managed.  Top management must 
provide the initial heat-up and the subsequent cooling-down by establishing what works and 
what does not work and then readjusting search away from elements that proved to be value-
enhancing.     
. Because the organization can rely less on standardized interfaces in the BMI process, 
the organization design must support mutual adjustment by providing for formal and informal 
arenas for communication and coordination. It is important that the reward structures are 
realigned with the new BM roadmap. The reward system is a primary instrument to 
communicate the roadmap and to motivate the development of the new BM (Siggelkow & 
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Rivkin 2003; Kaplan & Henderson 2005). The incentive system therefore becomes an important 
complement to the leadership approach of the design team: Senior management may only 
fruitfully act as a the moderator if the criteria for moderation are clear, and one way is to 
communicate clearly what it expected from subordinates and employees.  
Top management as architect. The revolutionary BMI—that is, architectural and radical 
changes—is the most challenging and risky one. It takes the firm into new territory and is 
associated with a high level of Knightian uncertainty. It requires entrepreneurial judgment by the 
top management team, – and its communication to the entire organization. Top management 
becomes the architect that not just provides a broad roadmap, but who is actively involved in 
everyday experimentation and decision-making to realize the perceived potential of her original 
entrepreneurial judgment. Steve Jobs’ leadership at Apple exemplifies this leadership style 
(Isaacson, 2011). He was obsessed with technical and business details. This also implies that 
many decisions are taken centrally and are not delegated to subordinates, because their derived 
judgment may not be aligned with the original conception of the new business model (Foss & 
Klein, 2012).  
Architectural, radical BMI by its very nature limits the value of standardized interfaces, but 
also of decentralized mutual adjustment. At the same time, incentives may only offer limited 
guidance, because the Knightian uncertainty inherited in the type of BMI defeats the goal of 
specifying and incentivizing relevant performance metrics. Indeed, the risk here is that incentives 
privilege easy-to-measure tasks over hard-to-measure tasks and thereby drives out search, 
experimentation, cooperation, and communication (e.g. Roberts, 2010). These tasks are of 
critical importance to address the outlined challenges of experimentation and coherence in 
revolutionary BMI.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, we have outlined a contingency theory of BMI. Our starting point is that to make 
progress regarding the understanding of the leadership and other organizational challenges of 
BMI, it is necessary to dimensionalize the unit of analysis. Drawing on innovation theory 
(Henderson & Clark, 1990) and work on complementarities (Milgrom & Roberts, 1990; 
Brynjolfsson & Milgrom, 2013), we suggest that BMI differ in terms of the strength of the 
complementarities between the elements of the business model that are being innovated. Some 
BMI are more modular, while others are more architectural. Also, BMI can be dimensionalized 
in terms how radical they are. We argued that the leadership challenges systematically depend on 
the nature of the relevant BMI, and suggested, but did not systematically unfold, that 
organizational design requirements similarly systematically vary with the nature of the BMI. 
 While the framework we have sketched is in principle a self-contained, testable 
contingency theory, it is also clear that it can be extended and refined in many ways.  For 
example, although we have directed attention to internal organization as an important aspect of 
how top-management can support BMI, we have not touched on the broader organizational 
design issues that involve the boundaries of the firm. It is clear, however, that firm boundaries 
must inherently be part of business model design and therefore also BMI; after all, business 
models involve backstream and upstream vertical linkages that transcend the boundaries of the 
firm. Ultimately, activities, assets and transactions are internalized within the boundaries of the 
firm because this affords control and authority (Hart, 1995). When activities, etc. are placed 
outside of the boundaries of the firm, the level of control is smaller. For example, Lego 
outsourced many of its plastic operations to Flextronics, a major international supply chains 
solutions company, but had to realize that this diminished Lego’s control over plastic quality to 
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an extent that Lego was not willing to accept. As a result, a number of initial outsourcing 
decisions were later reversed (Foss et al., 2012).  In terms of the theory we have presented in this 
chapter, the import of the point about the boundaries of the firm is that these somehow need to be 
controlled for in empirical work on BMI.  
 Another omission is that we have neglected key process aspects of BMI. Thus, we have 
not addressed issues of managerial cognition related to sensing the need for BMI. It is also 
intuitive that dynamics in the top-management team can influence the success of business model, 
depending on the nature of the BMI. Thus, architectural BMI, particularly when these are also 
radical  (cf. Figure 2) require an effective, aligned top-management team. It may also require a 
relatively large top-management team with many functional specialists in order to secure that the 
team is close to those operations and processes that not only need to be changed but also need to 
have those changes tightly coordinated.  Future work will, to borrow a phrase, address these 
issues.  
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Figure 1: Mapping Complementarities in the Lego Business Model Innovation 
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Figure 2: Dimensionalizing Business Model Innovation 
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Figure 3: The Role of Top Management Different Business Model Innovations 
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